Donald Trump spoke of the possibility of a new military operation against Iran, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claim that two supertankers carrying together more than 4.5 million barrels of crude have struck mines near the Strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, Washington is trimming staff at several embassies, and Tehran is threatening attacks on submarine cables. The crisis is driving oil prices higher and darkening regional economic prospects.
Three figures to note : more than 4.5 million barrels carried by two tankers according to Iran; Brent at $116.72 at Friday’s close; -1.3% growth expected in 2026 for the IMF-studied region.
Trump weighs a new operation against Iran
At a campaign rally on Friday, October 23 in Florida, U.S. President Donald Trump said that the United States could carry out another operation of the “Epic Fury” type, the label given to the American military campaign against Iran. He did not specify any timetable or military objectives. Earlier, he had asserted that Washington could quickly end the conflict, also mentioning the U.S. capability to seize Iran’s oil. These remarks are political statements and not the announcement of a decided operation.
This new warning comes as the U.S. midterm elections on November 3 approach. American media have reported strike scenarios studied in coordination with Israel for the period after the election, though no definitive order has been announced. The war launched on February 28 and the subsequent truce have not yielded a durable settlement of the dispute.
Two supertankers reported damaged near Hormuz
The navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced on Friday that two supertankers had struck sea mines after following a route it deems unauthorized to the south of the Strait of Hormuz. According to its statement, explosions and fires immobilized the engine rooms; the crews reportedly abandoned the ships.
The two tankers were carrying, again according to the Iranian version, more than 4.5 million barrels of crude oil in total. The identities of the vessels, the extent of the damage, and any potential consequences for their cargo were not independently established in the available information. This announcement also does not allow one to determine whether these two ships are different from those cited in Iran’s reports in the preceding days.
Maritime security degradation is nevertheless documented. According to a census by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, cited by Reuters, 28 confirmed or reported attacks were recorded in October around Hormuz and adjacent routes, versus 113 since the start of the war at the time of the tally. The International Maritime Organization counted, under a broader scope, 120 incidents in the region. These statistics, drawn from different methods and perimeters, should not be added together.
Threats to Internet cables: a risk for the Gulf
Two senior Iranian security officials, speaking anonymously to Reuters on October 23, say that plans exist to target the Gulf’s underwater telecommunications cables in the event of further U.S. and Israeli strikes. One of them also mentioned the possibility of hampering repairs to prolong disruptions. These are conditional threats, not attacks already carried out.
An official from the Revolutionary Guards cited seven main cables passing under the Strait of Hormuz as potential targets. The risk would particularly affect regional connections, financial services, e-commerce, and cloud platforms. According to data recalled by Reuters, about 99% of global Internet traffic traverses submarine cables, but less than 1% of international bandwidth passes through Hormuz. A cut in this strait would therefore not imply a global Internet outage.
Data centers and artificial intelligence infrastructures located in Gulf countries are also among the facilities mentioned in Iranian warnings. The continuity of services would then depend on backup routes, rerouting capabilities, and access to repair zones.
Washington trims embassies amid security alert
The United States has reduced the staff of its diplomatic representations in the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Qatar, and Jordan. In Saudi Arabia, the departure of non-essential personnel and dependents had already been ordered in Riyadh as well as at the consulates in Jeddah and Dhahran. The announced adjustments do not imply a general closure of these embassies, which remain open with restrictions.
According to Axios and CBS News, a note dated October 23, addressed to Secretary of State Marco Rubio by National Intelligence Director Jay Clayton, reports an intensification of alleged Iranian plots targeting American nationals and officials abroad. The document, whose authenticity was confirmed by an American official, does not publicly specify targets, countries outside the Middle East, or the modalities of the alleged plots.
U.S. authorities invoke these intelligence findings, along with risks related to Houthi attacks, to justify the reduction of their regional personnel. Tehran, for its part, warns that a resumption of attacks could widen the conflict to American bases and the region’s strategic infrastructure.
Turkey and Russia: diplomatic steps continue
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Friday that a new military intervention against Iran would worsen the war rather than end it. He spoke after consultations in Istanbul with representatives from Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy.
Meanwhile, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced that President Massoud Pezeshkian would travel to Moscow next week to continue consultations with Vladimir Putin. The visit is to be part of Russo-Iranian political and economic cooperation, notably ahead of a summit of gas-exporting countries planned for October 27.
IMF sees a 1.3% regional economy contraction in 2026
The geopolitical shock is accompanied by economic deterioration. In its regional outlook published on October 22, the International Monetary Fund projects a contraction of 1.3% in 2026 for the aggregate area comprising the Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan, followed by a 6.6% rebound in 2027. These are projections for this aggregated zone, not rates applicable to Tunisia individually.
The rebound forecast assumes a easing of the conflict and a gradual normalization of trade and energy flows in 2027. The IMF notes that activity would, despite this rebound, remain below the trajectory expected before the war. Exporting economies whose production and transport capacities are directly affected bear a substantial share of the losses.
In a pessimistic scenario where fighting would extend to the second quarter of 2027, the average oil price could reach about $130 per barrel. The actual production level of exporters directly impacted would then be 3.8% below the baseline scenario in 2027: this figure measures a gap between scenarios, not a guaranteed 3.8% additional contraction.
Oil at $116.72, gas and food prices rising
Brent closed on Friday, October 23 at $116.72 per barrel, up 3.14% on the session, according to Reuters. It gained about 6% for the week. Attacks around oil routes, tensions in Saudi Arabia, and a marine pollution incident reported in the United Arab Emirates feed concerns about supplies.
According to a presentation of the IMF’s latest analyses, natural gas prices in September were about 150% above their pre-war levels. Energy, fertilizer, transport, and insurance costs could contribute to a roughly 5% rise in food prices in 2026 and 2.4% in 2027 in the scenarios mentioned. These figures describe estimated effects of the crisis and do not correspond to Tunisia’s observed food inflation.
Energy-importing countries overall have fared better than some major exporters cut off from markets. The IMF projects for the region’s emerging and middle-income oil-importing economies growth of around 4.2% in 2026, supported notably by domestic demand, tourism and remittances.
Tunisia: the 2027 budget facing fuel risk
For Tunisia, the most immediate impact comes from the energy bill, freight costs, and potentially the price of imported inputs. According to the National Institute of Statistics, the energy trade deficit reached 10.48 billion dinars in the first nine months of 2026, versus 8.1064 billion in the same period of 2025, an increase of about 29.3%. This deficit accounts for nearly half of the total trade deficit at the end of September.
The Tunisian budget proposal for 2027 relies on an average Brent price between 75 and 80 dollars in its general assumptions. For energy support expenditures, it assumes 80 dollars and plans 7.09 billion dinars of subsidies to hydrocarbons and electricity. The Friday spot price of 116.72 dollars is higher by 36.72 dollars, or 45.9%, than that assumption. This gap cannot be equated with an automatic rise in the annual cost of subsidies: it will depend on the average price in 2027, volumes, the exchange rate, and public arrangements.
Tourism, remittances from Tunisians living abroad, and European demand may offer resilience factors, but no available figure allows attributing to this renewed spike a precise net impact on Tunisian growth. The main risk remains a prolonged disruption of energy and goods flows, likely to weigh simultaneously on public finances and business costs.
