The Circular No. 2026-04 of the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT), which imposes 100% funding from its own resources for so-called non-priority imports, sits in a context of strong macroeconomic tensions.
Pressure on foreign exchange reserves, volatility of energy prices, fragility of the dinar and persistent external imbalances: the framework within which this decision is made is far from neutral.
Institutionally, the stated objective is clear: to limit external vulnerabilities and contain outflows of foreign currency in a delicate environment. Beyond this precautionary logic, the measure raises a broader question about the nature of the trade-offs currently at work in the Tunisian economy.
Liquidity Constraint
Seemingly, the circular does not block the imports concerned. It does, however, profoundly change the access conditions. From now on, operators must mobilize the full amounts needed themselves, with no recourse to bank financing.
This change is far from purely technical. It shifts the center of gravity of economic activity: market access depends less on the project’s solvency than on the liquidity immediately available. In such a scheme, companies with abundant cash reserves retain room to maneuver, while weaker players, notably small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), see their import capacity reduced mechanically.
In an economic fabric where small and medium-sized enterprises play a structurally central role, this type of restriction can produce an implicit selection effect. Without formally banning certain operators, it redraws the balance of power in favor of the most capitalized structures.
Foreign Exchange Reserves: An Indirect Impact
The main argument advanced in favor of the measure is the preservation of foreign exchange reserves. Yet, on a strictly accounting basis, the reasoning is not entirely linear: whether an import is financed by bank credit or by own cash, the final demand for foreign currency remains.
The anticipated effect thus seems less tied to the nature of the financing than to its deterrent effect. By making non-priority imports more liquidity-costly, the BCT presumably hopes to reduce their volume. The circular thus acts as an indirect rationing mechanism rather than a true instrument for regulating reserves.
This reading also points to another underlying tension: liquidity in dinars. In a context where the state absorbs a sizable portion of resources from the banking system to finance its needs, the credit space available to the private sector contracts. The measure can thus be interpreted as a reflection of a broader trade-off in the allocation of financing within the economy.
The Persistent Ambiguity
One of the most sensitive points of the circular lies in the distinction between “priority” and “non-priority” products. In theory, the logic may seem obvious. In practice, it is far from obvious.
Value chains are now fragmented, product uses are multiple, and the boundaries between final consumption, intermediate inputs, and goods that support activity are often porous. A product considered ancillary in an administrative reading can, in some sectors, constitute a useful link to production, distribution, or competitiveness.
The risk is then to freeze the economy into a too-static classification, ill-suited to the reality of firms. Such an approach can produce significant side effects, indirectly penalizing activities that are not immediately visible in the regulatory reading grid.
A Risk of Concentration
Beyond the objective of stabilization, the measure could also have significant microeconomic effects. By reducing import capacity for the least liquid operators, it can contribute to a greater concentration of certain markets.
Fewer players often means less competition. In the medium term, this can translate into less diversity of supply, increased market power for certain importers, and price tensions, especially if demand remains relatively inelastic.
Additionally, there is another well-known risk in the Tunisian economy: the partial shift of flows toward informal channels. When formal channels become more constrained or costly, parallel markets automatically regain attractiveness. The collective cost is high: loss of tax revenues, lower quality of regulated products, and weaker economic transparency.
A Cyclical Measure and Structural Fragilities
One of the main issues raised by this circular lies in the gap between the nature of the problem and the nature of the response. The trade deficit, energy dependence, weakness of certain productive sectors, and persistent pressure on external accounts primarily reflect structural imbalances.
However, restricting the financing conditions for imports remains a cyclical instrument. It can offer relief, slow down certain flows, and temporarily ease a constraint. But it does not, on its own, modify the deep determinants of external vulnerability.
In this sense, the measure can be defended as an instrument of emergency management, provided it fits into a broader strategy. Without support from industrial, energy, budgetary, and logistical policies, it risks mainly squeezing activity rather than truly correcting imbalances.
Macro-economic Discipline and the Need for a Vision
The BCT faces a classic dilemma: protecting macroeconomic balances without stifling an economy that is already not very dynamic. In the current context, the demand for financial discipline is hardly contestable. But it cannot, on its own, constitute an economic policy.
Circular No. 2026-04 thus appears as a coherent response to the immediate constraint, but incomplete regarding the longer-term challenges. Its effectiveness will depend less on regulatory rigor than on the capacity of the authorities to align it with a vision of productive transformation.
Otherwise, Tunisia risks prolonging a cycle now familiar: managing the emergency, containing the flows, only to find that the initial vulnerabilities remain entirely intact.
