The proliferation of poor economic indicators in France might seem far from Tunisian concerns.
Yet it is the opposite. France, Tunisia’s top customer and the leading foreign investor in the country, constitutes one of the main channels through which a European slowdown is transmitted to the Tunisian economy.
And this French weakness arrives at a moment when surging energy prices threaten directly the Tunisian trade balance and public finances.
What to remember
French growth is expected to reach only about 0.4% to 0.5% in 2026, while unemployment, the cost of debt and energy prices rise.
France accounts for around 23% of Tunisian exports, and French-owned companies employ nearly 170,000 people in Tunisia.
In the short term, the most dangerous shock for Tunisia remains energy-related: Tunisian energy imports rose by 28.5% in the first eight months of 2026.
Tunisia could thus face both weaker European demand and a much heavier energy bill.
France enters a near-zero growth zone
France’s latest economic forecasts have clearly darkened the outlook for 2026.
The French government now foresees growth of only 0.5 % this year. INSEE is slightly more pessimistic, with an estimate of 0.4 %.
After a 0.2% contraction in GDP in the first quarter, the French economy stagnated in the second quarter. France would thus progress much more slowly than several of its major European partners.
This slowdown comes at a bad moment. Geopolitical tensions around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz have reignited prices for oil, gas and fuels, reintroducing an inflation risk Europe had been gradually mastering.
Purchasing power shrinking and unemployment rising
The French slowdown is now evident in several indicators that directly concern households.
In the second quarter, purchasing power per unit of consumption fell by 0.6 %. For 2026 as a whole, INSEE anticipates a 0.4 % drop in purchasing power, while household consumption would barely rise.
Unemployment rose to 8.3 % in the second quarter and could reach 8.6 % by year-end. The French economy could also shed several tens of thousands of salaried jobs in 2026.
For Tunisia, these indicators are particularly important. Weak French growth only becomes problematic when it starts weighing on consumption, investment, and orders from firms.
Investment and industry also show signs of weakness
Business investment in France should slightly decline this year, while household investment would contract further.
Manufacturing output also fell over the summer. In July, it dropped by 0.8% after a 1% decline in June.
France’s current account remains in deficit, with a deficit of several billions of euros each month, while corporate failures remain at elevated levels.
This is not an economic collapse. France still has strong sectors, notably in aerospace, luxury, defense, services and technologies. But the overall indicators describe an economy now advancing at a very slow pace.
Debt limits Paris’s room for maneuver
The second French problem concerns public finances.
Public debt already exceeded €3.5 trillion in the first quarter, i.e., about 117.5% of GDP.
The government has also acknowledged that the objective of a public deficit limited to 5% of GDP in 2026 is becoming hard to attain.
Interest payments should approach €65 billion this year. In an environment of high rates, every new expenditure aimed at protecting households against inflation or energy becomes more costly for the French state.
A major change compared to 2022
During the previous energy shock, France deployed significant protective mechanisms for electricity, gas and fuel prices. With higher debt and much more expensive interest rates, reproducing today a mechanism of the same scale would be markedly more difficult.
The specter of 3 euros per liter
The rise in fuel prices now represents one of the main risks for the French economy.
At the start of September, SP95-E10 averaged more than €2.10 per liter and diesel around €2.28.
The scenario of fuel at €3 per liter, mentioned in several French media, is neither the current price nor a certain forecast. It represents a crisis scenario in the hypothesis that tensions around oil and the Strait of Hormuz would deteriorate sustainably.
Such a level would have significant consequences for travel, road transport, food prices, tourism and household consumption.
Former European Commissioner Thierry Breton also mentioned on LCI a global bill of around €26 billion, or about €875 per household, linked to the combination of geopolitical tensions, energy and new trade constraints. This figure, however, should be presented as a macroeconomic estimate rather than a charge directly paid by each household.
After Russian gas, dependence on American gas
The other fundamental transformation concerns gas.
Before the war in Ukraine, Russia accounted for nearly 45% of Europe’s gas imports. The European Union has since significantly reduced this dependence.
But part of that dependence has been replaced by another: American liquefied natural gas.
In 2025, the United States supplied about 26% of all EU gas imports and nearly 58% of its LNG imports.
This share could rise sharply in the coming years. Some projections estimate that American LNG could account for up to 80% of Europe’s LNG purchases in 2028 if the current trend continues.
France is directly affected: it imports about 97% of the gas it consumes, notably from Norway, the United States and Algeria.
Europe has thus moved away from Russian gas, but has become more exposed to the global LNG market and to American energy decisions.
Why Tunisia is directly concerned
The first figure to remember is 23 %.
France absorbs around 23% of Tunisia’s merchandise exports. It remains Tunisia’s leading commercial customer and one of its most important economic partners.
Trade in goods between the two countries reached nearly €8.9 billion in 2025.
In other words, when a French company cuts its purchases, its production or its investments, part of the shock can gradually be transmitted to Tunisian suppliers.
First risk: Tunisian exports
The Franco-Tunisian economic relationship largely rests on integrated supply chains.
Tunisian companies manufacture electric, electronic, mechanical, automotive, textile or aerospace components destined for the French market or for French industrial groups.
A prolonged drop in French consumption and production could therefore eventually affect the order books of some Tunisian companies.
For now, this risk has not yet materialized in Tunisia’s external trade figures.
During the first eight months of 2026, Tunisian exports to France rose by 3.4 %.
It would therefore be premature to talk about contagion already established. The risk concerns especially the coming months and the year 2027 if French weakness persists.
Second risk: French investment in Tunisia
France is also the leading foreign investor in Tunisia.
Approximately 1,600 French-participated companies are established in the country and represent nearly 170,000 jobs.
A slowdown in French corporate investment could therefore delay certain projects, plant expansions or hiring in Tunisia.
But this relationship can also produce the inverse effect.
The higher production costs rise in France, the more Tunisia can become attractive for groups looking to nearshore certain activities toward Europe while reducing their costs.
French weakness can thus be both a risk to existing orders and an opportunity for nearshoring for Tunisia.
Diaspora and tourism: two effects to watch
Rising unemployment and falling purchasing power in France could also indirectly affect remittances from Tunisians living in France.
At this stage, no data allows us to speak of a decline in remittances to Tunisia. It is therefore an indicator to monitor rather than an established consequence.
Tourism presents a more nuanced situation.
Lower purchasing power can reduce French holiday spending. But it can also push more households toward cheaper destinations.
In this scenario, Tunisia could even benefit from its price positioning relative to France, Spain or Italy.
The main danger for Tunisia remains, however, elsewhere
The French slowdown represents a real risk for Tunisia. But in the short term, the most significant danger likely comes from the energy bill.
The latest Tunisian external trade figures are particularly revealing.
In the first eight months of 2026, Tunisian imports of energy products rose by 28.5 %.
The energy deficit reached about 8.93 billion dinars, up from 7.15 billion a year earlier.
Meanwhile, Tunisia’s overall trade deficit stood at around 17.85 billion dinars.
Key figure
The energy deficit alone accounts for almost half of Tunisia’s trade deficit. A lasting rise in oil and gas thus represents a far more immediate risk for Tunisia than a slowdown of a few tenths of a point in French growth.
Why energy hits Tunisia much faster
An increase in oil and gas prices affects several Tunisian balances at once.
It widens the trade deficit, increases the need for foreign currency, raises production costs for industry, weighs on public finances and can raise the charges borne by state-owned energy companies.
It also ends up transmitting, directly or indirectly, to transportation, agricultural products, materials and consumer prices.
That is why the Hormuz shock today constitutes a much more immediate macroeconomic threat for Tunisia.
Algeria, a strategic shock absorber
Tunisia nevertheless holds an advantage that most European countries do not possess: its energy proximity to Algeria.
Tunisia’s territory is crossed by the gas pipeline linking Algeria to Italy. Tunisia collects a transit fee related to the gas transit and supplements its supply with purchases of Algerian gas.
If Europe seeks even more to diversify its supplies and strengthen Algeria’s role, the strategic importance of this infrastructure could increase.
This provides a buffer for Tunisia, but not a complete protection against the rise in global energy prices.
The scenario to watch: two simultaneous shocks
The risk for Tunisia can finally be summarized in two movements.
The first comes from France. An economy almost at a standstill, with lower consumption, less investment and higher unemployment, could gradually reduce orders to Tunisian firms.
The second comes from the global energy market. Persistently high oil and pricier gas immediately exacerbate Tunisia’s energy deficit and needs for foreign currency.
Taken separately, each of these shocks remains manageable.
The real risk appears if they occur simultaneously and for a prolonged period: Tunisia could then pay more for its energy at the very moment its first foreign client slows its purchases.
It is this combination, more than the mere weakness of the French economy, that Tunisian authorities and businesses will need to monitor in the coming months.
